Refractions Off Empire:
Untimely Comparisons in Harsh Times

Ann Laura Stoler with David Bond

For many of those of my generation, U.S. imperial interventions have long exerted an insistent presence on our intimate social ecologies, casting a pall over intellectual choices, political engagements, and academic lives, while for those more distant from the study of empire, the events of 9/11, the supposedly temporary occupation of Iraq, Guantánamo detentions, and the torture tactics at Abu Ghraib seem to have registered as horrific affronts to political perception. Among those whose work has long drawn them to the violent entailments of imperial history, these phenomena may register as something else: at once familiar, anachronistic, and historically resonant. Boldly new and disturbingly the same. This is neither to claim the conceit of prediction, nor to reduce what is specific to the violences of this contemporary moment as history replayed as farce. Rather, it is to suggest that the conditions of possibility for what U.S. empire looks like today may be deeply embedded in the blunt and elusive nature of a broader range of historical imperial formations. It is, in other words, to attend to what we have and have not recognized about the changing content of these formations, their structures of knowledge production, haunted sites, and unexpected and intimate forms.

It is hard not to notice that empire is back among political pundits to explain American military intervention in ways that were rare less than a decade ago.1 As neoconservatives lead a return to empire and to celebratory historical renditions of it with nostalgic vengeance, we need to rethink the relevance of old questions and
formulate new ones: What should effective histories of empire look like now? Why do some of the principal concerns of postcolonial scholarship seem wooden and stale, inadequate tools for writing histories of the present? Disagreement about how those of us who have long studied imperial expansions and colonial cultures might speak to contemporary U.S. interventions is particularly charged; not least because politicians and policy makers with little knowledge of how empires have worked and scholars seeing the urgency of speaking in new ways to the imperial present (and for whom empire may once have not been a salient category) have joined the fray. Critiques are unfolding in many directions, but one perception is shared: a décalage, a gap of sorts, between the prevailing models of empire that scholars have embraced and the current landscapes of geopolitics.

Within this contemporary political space, competition is fierce to name the denouement of colonial studies, if not its death. Arif Dirlik insists that the preoccupation with colonial history distracts from understanding the forms of suffering that pervade the world that cannot be accounted for by it. Frederick Cooper argues that what we need are not more abstract accounts but specific colonial histories, messier in their detail, peopled, and on the ground. For others still, the very category of empire is problematic on the dubious claim that treating metropole and colony as a single analytic by definition risks diluting the epistemic and political differences between them.

The diagnoses of failing paradigms may be shared, but the sorts of solutions sought are not. Some move to definitional precision about what counts as an empire and imperial intervention. Others move to an abandonment of the very terms. Those of us impatient with the retreat to definitional debates would still hold firmly that the force of imperial macropolities is lodged in and exercised through the ambiguously opaque and creative terms of these vocabularies themselves. Rather than turn away from what Hannah Arendt called “the wild confusion of historical terminology,” we would do better to stay close to it. These vocabularies rest on what I see as the systemic degrees of sovereignty and gradations of rights that imperial formations produce and on which they solidly depend.

The slippage between what is “colonial” and what is “imperial” about the United States is more than a fraught scholarly debate. It is the history of how U.S. empire works. These uncertainties are not conceptual liabilities but the very artifice of U.S. empire. They are, thus, entry points for analysis that challenge what constitutes colonialism “proper” as much as what constitutes the U.S. “exception.” Instead of entering into the stale debate over U.S. exceptionalism, which I take as a stalled one, we might rather ask what might be learned about imperial formations by studying the disparate spaces of U.S. empire’s patent virulence, deceptive absence, and shifting legal coordinates. The point is not whether the United States is an excep-
tion but how U.S. empire, in a familiar imperial mode, has historically constructed places exempt from scrutiny and peoples partially excluded from rights.

Students of colonial history may have less to say than one might expect about the current nature of empire because our models, unlike our objects of inquiry, have become brittle, unyielding to the range of practices, and to the blurred genres of rule and rhetoric, that mark imperial relations. While assiduously attuned to the pliable and diverse forms of rule that operate in specific locales, students of colonial history are hesitant to put those insights to work in understanding the nature of imperial formations more generally. Empires are not brittle. It is our conceptions of empire that become so when we force them into an either/or conversation. Empires have thrived on and continue to thrive on conceptual pluralities; critiques of empire, it would seem, do not.

What is striking in the new empire literature that pervades the public domain is a focus on macroscales of policy and strategy, security and design that somehow remain unmoored to micromovements of peoples who are subject and scarred, beholden to and invested in these empires on the ground. This is not a matter of advocating the micro over the macro or vice versa. It is rather a call to identify those structured imperial predicaments by tracing them through the durabilities of duress in the subsoil of affective landscapes, in the weight of memory, in the maneuvers around the intimate management of people’s lives.⁷

The point is a simple but critical one. Imperial forms of rule are dependent on moving categories, parts, and populations. They locate themselves not in the color-coded maps for British schoolchildren with fixed boundaries and clearly demarcated borders culled from our models of nation-states, but by wide thresholds of partial sovereignties and territorial claims that produce contradictory legal entitlements and ambiguous human rights.⁸ Expansion and conquest, intervention and force should not be overlooked because they lack easy recognition and are called by other names. Considering what makes Guam, Samoa, Guantánamo, Puerto Rico, and Native American reservation lands both part of the United States and decidedly outside it, what gives some of its habitants rights to vote in local elections but not in federal ones, what produces nomenclatures that indicate “national” but not “citizen” is to confront a basic feature of imperial formations: namely, that modern empires thrive on such plasticities and reproduce their resilience through the production of exceptions. Nor is the disclaimer of a sui generis status a Euro-American imperial invention: Ottoman, Russian, and Chinese empires, like the French, Dutch, and U.S., have all insisted at different moments that their raison d’être was different, that their violences were temporary, and that their humanitarian visions excused or distinguished their interventions as ad hoc measures, not sustained excesses.
Out of Focus But Well within Bounds

Understanding how the United States has remained so long dislocated from much of postcolonial scholarship is a subject I have tried to think through elsewhere and can only allude to here. I argue that some of the problem stems from the development of area studies as a specifically U.S. form of knowledge production. What was called area studies, established in the 1940s postwar period to target areas of the world “of critical concern” to U.S. national security, made U.S. interests at once outside what regional experts needed to know and central to the organization of that expert knowledge. Thus a definition of areas of concern encouraged treatment of the United States and its history of empire as a shadow presence, rendering sustained attention to the kind of power U.S. empire asserts at once intangible, tangential, and focus on it seen as either inflated or misplaced. In this, area studies worked to deflect what kept U.S. empire out of focus, its activities below the radar and out of bounds.

Reacting to the Department of Defense’s design to sequester knowledge production through area studies, many critical thinkers turned their analytic gaze to other sites and other scales. While many anthropologists in the 1970s and 1980s tracked the effects of a “world capitalist system” (in the form of foreign-owned mining enterprises, industry, and agricultural estates) in structured inequalities and in local lives, ethnographic history missed a U.S. presence of other sorts—investment portfolios, banking conglomerates, oil refineries, nuclear testing grounds and their durable debris, and military presences in the form of advising, materiel, and training in addition to military bases.

“World capitalist systems” analysis focused more on what it took to be the foundational features of global inequity, namely unequal circulations of capital that produced the geopolitics of concentrated poverty and wealth. It did not reckon with how much these systems were colonial through and through—in the subjects they created, in the palpable lessons of the everyday, in how race was imposed, and in how sexuality was managed.

Some Cold War categories central to area studies (namely, development and modernization theory) were effectively challenged in the 1970s, but it was Edward Said’s turn to the politics of knowledge production that exploded the possibilities of imperial critique. Said’s *Orientalism* provided a new set of analytic tools to recast specific forms of cultural productions as the creative gravity of imperial politics. But as this project was taken up, it had perhaps an unanticipated effect. Somehow attention turned not to where Said himself had located it, but selectively elsewhere. With few exceptions, Said’s insights were applied to Europe and the past, not to the United States and the present. Intellectual labor turned to only a slice of historical colonialisms (France and England foremost, and the Netherlands and Spain) for which U.S. empire was rendered an awkward, ill-fitting part.
Said’s project was a concerted history of the nature of hegemonic power in the present and—as he insisted, and we would do well to remember—it was squarely about the United States.

Today there is a new war of relevance. As the Department of Defense once again turns its focus and funds toward strategic knowledge production, what most academics study has been considered either too partisan or just not pertinent enough. Outside the academe, such programs have been considered either too immersed in applied issues or “too safely distant” and oblivious to them. As neoconservatives argue for Congress to revamp the allocation and distribution of federal funds, it is “radical third worldists” who “shut [the academe] off from dissent, from the public, and from Washington”—who have turned cultural/literary/historical studies into anti-U.S. political terrain.

A new generation of critical scholars have targeted areas studies as not only unnecessary in a globalizing world but as modeled on an unequal and uneven concentration of intellectual entitlements and resources, defining who gets to be a specialist. In the 1990s, many scholars turned away on principle or abandoned the field out of indifference. Others like Vicente Rafael saw the very notion of a “region” as a “social diacritic” that marked off scales of distinction, managed sites of higher education, and produced a field of exclusions in them. For those schooled during and against the Vietnam War, some of these criticisms may read as a déjà vu. Kathleen Gough’s assertion that anthropology was “the handmaiden of imperialism” in the 1960s was followed by revelations that ethnographic work in Thailand was being used for CIA counterinsurgency projects, and the debate Eric Wolf spearheaded about anthropology’s scholarly ethics may seem to cover similar terrain. But neither the critiques nor the sorts of knowledge in question nor the political uses of history are really the same. Selective comparison of colonial history lessons in the academe and beyond configures a different field for how “cultural knowledge” is used, who is using it, and how history matters.

Historical literacy should disquiet and discomfort rather than reassure. Instead of historical comparisons between Rome, Britain, and the United States, we might trace unexpected convergences and the uneven resilience of imperial connections. Scarred landscapes register some imperial effects—proliferating zones of degraded legal rights register others. Significantly, these latter are new only in a limited sense; they are as much the political and economic deposits of racialized geographies as they are the consequences of newly refigured imperial relations.

**The Imperial Politics of Cultural Intelligence**

Anthropologists and historians of the present have before them a challenging task. As critiques of empire are turning to the global movements of capital and force, the military is making a peculiar turn toward culture. We need to profoundly reorient
what we imagine critical ethnographies of empire to be, in part because the ethnographic has become strategic military terrain. We need to read not the Nation and Le Monde diplomatique but the National Interest, military.com, Department of Defense staff reports, the Small Wars Journal, and the literally thousands of online military publications that provide the training ground of national security policy makers and the military elite. “Culture-centric warfare,” as Major General Robert Scales Jr. calls it, is hot.15 Cultural knowledge is the buzzword and the new priority of the military establishment and those scholars helping to produce it. The latter (with ample funds from such institutions as the Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program) cannot be dismissed as second-rate social scientists. As the Australian Land Warfare Studies Centre puts it, the goal is to acquire anthropological know-how to “shape the future of warfare”—note there is no pretense that this is for the future of peace.16 “Strategic culture,” a conceptual holdover from the Cold War, has been invested with new relevance, producing an “intimate knowledge” of the enemy on which intelligence depends.17 As Colin Gray, specialist on nuclear strategy, understands, and Pierre Bourdieu might agree, “strategic culture is the world of mind, feeling and habit of behavior.”18 “Why Culture Matters” is the thesis title of Jennifer Chandler, a recent graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School.19 Adversary culture is the term Montgomery McFate, with her Yale PhD in anthropology, gives to her extensively cited mission to encourage military anthropology to “know your enemy” in the details of the everyday.20 Lt. Colonel George Smith urges a “cultural intelligence preparation of the battlespace,” or “IPB” for short, as the priority knowledge in the “strategic calculus” of contemporary warfare.21 “Our intelligence networks need to regain a tactile human sense,” writes the former intelligence officer Ralph Peters; the “military should be looking for a few good anthropologists.”22 While government sights are set on “the enemy,” ours might be set on them and on how this rush to the intimate structures new sites of imperial governance.

Liberal and critical social scientists are not the only ones calling on history to make their political claims. It was the Pentagon in 2003 that staged a showing of The Battle of Algiers, posing to its attending military officers and civilian experts whether “the advantages and costs of resorting to torture and intimidation in seeking vital human intelligence” were worth the cost.23 By the time of Abu Ghraib it was clear that the Pentagon showing was not a history lesson but a chillingly prescient portrayal, not of the possible and aberrant, but of carefully honed torture tactics, spelled out in the U.S. empire’s zones of war that now bleed the boundaries of homeland and foreign and the frontiers of war and peace.

**Empire, the Homeland, and the Security State after 9/11**

In the wake of 9/11, the landscape of area studies has radically changed and in some uncanny way promises to reassert features of earlier U.S. government agendas as it mandates new ones. The security state is back in a way it has not been for some
forty years. Many progressive scholars who had vacated those programs in the 1990s for what were perceived as more critical interdisciplinary ventures, are pausing to reconsider those moves with the resurgence of interest among neoconservatives in just these sites. Some regions are obviously of more immediate government interest than others, but an epidemiology of fear and a language of protection now hover over an ever wider breadth. Simulacrum and simulations, blanket universalisms and racially inspired particularisms are the name of the military game. A recent report of the Homeland Security Council offers fifteen detailed scenarios of “emergency preparedness” against an outside enemy, now newly named the “universal adversary.” However much academics may have once riled against foreign-language funding tethered to the Defense Department’s interests through the National Defense Education Act of 1958, in retrospect those surveillance techniques pale in comparison to the sorts of proposals and policy constrictions being activated now.

Government surveillance is well documented on the Internet, in debates in Congress, and in the press, but it is worth noting the sequence and pacing of new interventions here. When Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act in November 2001 it was in partial response to a lengthy report on “how our universities are failing America and what can be done about it.” Campus Watch, created by neoconservative Daniel Pipes in November 2002, began to post on the Internet “dossiers” of scholars deemed too critical of U.S. policy in the Middle East. In September 2003, Congress affirmed a new vigilance, installing an International Advisory Board for Title VI funding of university international programs. It is headed and populated solely by members of the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). By design it did not include academics in an effort to counter “anti-American bias.”

Liberal academics may be under attack, but some parts of the academe are enjoying a resurgence of government funding. Indeed, much of the action and redistribution of funds and research is quietly happening elsewhere. In July 2003, the DHS initiated a new university program for “Centers of Excellence” that would focus on “specific areas related to social science issues.” What was initially budgeted as 10 million dollars has since mushroomed to hundreds of millions. The University of Southern California has a three-year grant of 12 million dollars as the first Homeland Security Center of Excellence devoted to the study of the “economic consequences of terrorist threats and events.” In July 2004, the University of Minnesota received 15 million dollars for the Center for Food Protection and Defense, the fourth center of excellence on the “behavioral and social aspects of terrorism and counter-terrorism” to establish “sustained and innovative research and education efforts for the security of the nation.” Texas A & M and the University of California followed. In early 2005, the University of Maryland was granted 12 million dollars under the same expanding program. As the DHS bulletin states, “it is the kind of cooperation and coordination that America expects. And it is providing the
important security that all Americans deserve.” It would be naive to imagine that this is all new. What is new is the gathering of formerly disparate agencies and intentions in focused consolidation.

One response to this most recent boom in security research is to reappropriate that space for critical scholarship—and redefine what that is. Michael Kennedy insists on the importance of attending to “vernacular knowledge,” stressing an “alternative hermeneutics, one with different kinds of power relations and different theoretical and methodological opportunities.”31 At issue is what we mean by the critical. What produces principled irrelevance and irreverence? How do we get inside the “common sense” of political rationalities that have produced states of frenzied information collection and suspended judgment at the same time? How to take the ill fit of some sites and subjects—Guantánamo, Abu Ghraib, immigration detention centers, the emergence of new border vigilante groups made up of retired Marine sergeants with .38 caliber pistols strapped to their legs—and relocate their “out of place” quality as sites and subjects of analysis?32

There are no formulas, but only working concepts that wrestle with what counts as the critical confer advantage. For one, being critical is an ongoing operation, a principled insolence, not a reactive one. Generated out of the situations at hand, it makes certainties and fixities “more fragile.”33 Within such a view, the task of history is not to provide lessons as tame distractions, but to attune our sensibilities to dissonant events and arrested projects and to refigure those as constituent parts of the present. At issue is not the identification of conspiracy theories of U.S. power, but ways of untangling a set of political rubrics imbued with a widely resonant moral vocabulary that reframe and redefine what counts as imperial intervention and what does not.

Those terms signaling the unclarified sovereignties of U.S. imperial breadth—unincorporated territories, army bases in over 130 countries (with 200 bases added in 2004 alone)—are not the blurred edges of what more “authentic,” visible empires look like, but their empowered variants.34 The United States has mastered this art of governance, but again, uncertain domains of jurisdiction and ad hoc legal exemptions based on cultural difference framed as religious irrationalisms are familiar imperial principles. Rhetorics of exceptionalism are more than part of the discursive apparatus of empires: imperial states vigilantly produce excepted spaces, exemptions for certain populations, exclusions for others, and exit strategies from international law.

States of exception do something else. They produce “thresholds” between inside and out—thick or thin thresholds of ambiguous political status and territorial autonomy.35 As Amy Kaplan so succinctly has put it, “The foreign both remains lodged within the ‘domestic sense’ of the American nation and casts a dark shadow across its unstable borders.”36 The DHS is dedicated to redefining not overseas Others but U.S. interior frontiers in expanding that defensive corridor. Such an under-
standing invites students of empire to redraw their maps across internal distinctions, external ones, and across those widening pockets of persons caught in between. It demands we make comparisons that are counter-intuitive, what imperial archives and historiographies would render as jarring incommensurabilities and uncommon sense.

Silent Hemorrhaging of Public Life: Inaudible Intimacies, Muted Moments

My own preoccupation has been and continues to be with how empire haunts the everyday, the familiar, strange, and unarticulated ways in which empire has appeared and disappeared from the intimate and public spaces of U.S. history; how relations of empire crash through and then recede from easy purview, sunder families, and storm the sequestered spaces of institutions and the landscapes of people’s lives. I have previously sought them in orphanage and nursery records, police reports, housekeeping manuals, treatises on domestic hygiene, and school medical reports to register the intimate violence of imperial prescription and the knowledge people use to defy them. Today these hardly seem enough. Detention centers for so-called enemy combatants or illegal immigrants across Europe and the United States demand new ways of understanding the stench and humiliation of noncivilities, both in and outside of formal detention.

Michel de Certeau once argued that domains of the intimate represent “the dark reign of a non-distinction, a kind of ‘matter’ that never makes it into the analytical taxonomies of social form.” He writes of the intimate as “a silent hemorrhaging of public life by an uncontrollable individual mobility.” Such notions of the intimate splice through prison cells, as well as through homes, holding centers, the shared knowledge of border vigilantes and their prey, of women serving shell-shocked occupying forces in army barracks. It turns us to those caught in metropolitan zones of ambiguous rights as well as to those caught on empire’s geographic margins.

Refocusing the intimacies of empire on these sites draws us to subjacent displaced imperial histories wedged in the folds of dominant ones, and to a reordering of imperial history’s prevailing mode. Places suspended in time and place—whether Native American ones in conditions of drug-dependent despair or Vietnamese villages in which Agent Orange perdures in the soil and the deformed limbs of several generations—are not products of the same history nor subsumed by a seamless imperial one. They are, however, joined genealogies of the present whose disparate etiologies are structured by imperial convention and whose commonalities are arrested by the fashioning of its narrative.

The “silent hemorrhaging of public life” may take other forms. Racial profiling, for example, has a political etymology of a long imperial durée. Technologies of truth production—torture, confession, humiliation, isolation, and the threat of death—are honed inquisitional skills in the arts and crafts of imperial intelligence. Detecting “fraudulent, fabricated Europeans in the nineteenth-century Nether-
lands Indies," and "hidden enemies" of the right hue but wrong blood, those Christianized but with secreted affiliations and native mothers, those who took imperial rhetoric about equality too literally (and imagined it was applicable to them) were both the subjects and products of empire’s truth-producing experts.42 Trained to identify what could not be seen, and rewarded for amassing evidentiary knowledge, colonial agents produced their truths—measuring and making up differences that mattered (sexual, moral, medical, or otherwise) and that indexed the “true” interior dispositions of those “dangerous” subjects they marked.

The Department of Homeland Security and the Domesticities of Defense

To defeat an enemy that lurks in the shadows and seeks relentlessly for some small crack through which to slip their evil designs—such a victory requires the vigilance of every American, the diligent preparation of every community, and the collective will of our entire nation.

—Tom Ridge, 2004

What hemorrhages public life is a vigil of suspicion, a sensory alert that demands attention to minute difference, that prescribes a guard against differences that matter and those that do not. These are not new intimacies of empire. Rather, they are ones that should help us think differently about empire’s zones of exception that spill outside the spaces cordoned off as holding pens by barbed wire.

Such insights should lead us not only to Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib, but straight to the Department of Homeland Security. Perhaps what is most striking about the DHS is what the vastly reworked organization of knowledge that it orders and maintains allows it to do. Within its domain are now a staggering range of activities, organizations, and programs not covertly tied to it: some have been there for some time. While in September 2000 the U.S. Secret Service signed a partnership with the Boys and Girls Clubs of America to monitor drug use and school violence, these are now activities that fall under the DHS’s catalog of “Threats and Protection.”43 Emergency snow removal, hurricane preparedness, and terrorist attacks can “occur anytime,” whether “wrought by disaster or design,” states Tom Ridge, former secretary of the DHS.44 The DHS’s “Emergency Preparedness Guide” and “Home-ownership Alliance” does more than condense under one aegis all threats to property and person wrought by floods, terrorism, and hazardous waste; it participates in a compelling reordering of what counts as “defense” of hearth and home and what is “natural” to do about it. 45 “Preparedness,” as an organizing principle, structures a particular uncertainty of the future into the perception of the everyday.

Rather than debate endlessly American empire’s rise or fall, we might do better to ponder the ways in which lemonade stands and children act as the affective impetus in the DHS’s encompassing effort to requisition the future. Its Web site on home preparedness seems to effortlessly put together the war on terrorism with
an all-American snapshot of six children bathed in summer sun selling lemonade. There is, however, an effort exerted. We would do well to attend to that effort, to critically trace out the imperial modalities of that exertion, to cultivate a sensitivity to the ways in which U.S. empire leans into the everyday, evoking a specter of danger in our iconic images of home.

Categories do not necessarily cover similar kinds: no one would argue that tsunamis and terrorists are really the same. If categorization is theory driven, as students of cognition now argue, then we should be more attentive to changing grids of intelligibility in which those categories are framed. Progressive scholars are concerned to rethink the parameters of the new empire, but I am not convinced we know the inhabited space—the weathered sites, the material deposits, and the social etymologies—of ones that have long been there.

In the new preface to the twenty-fifth-anniversary edition of Orientalism, Said was to remind us again of the breadth of the configuration he sought to engage. He wrote of Arab stereotyping, terrorist caricatures, and Iraq, urging scholarship not to be “about” the world, but squarely in it. If “differential knowledge” owes its critical force “to the harshness with which it is opposed by everything surrounding it,” in these harsh times we would do well to attend to emergent knowledges and set our sights on untimely ones.

Notes
This paper is a response to the RHR editors who invited me to reflect on empire and my own changing sense of it. These issues have been thought through extensively with David Bond. Lawrence Hirschfeld and students in my graduate seminars at the New School for Social Research over the last two years have provoked the hardest questions. I thank them all.


7. An undercurrent of scholarship is moving in this direction. This is the theme of papers at a forthcoming conference: “Scarred Landscapes and Imperial Debris,” Department of Anthropology and Center for Historical Studies, New School for Social Research, May 2006.


10. See “On Vernacular Comparisons: Toward a Critical Area Studies and Its Emergent Forms” (paper presented at the Canadian Council of Areas Studies Learned Societies, Montreal, April 27, 2005).


15. Scales writes: “Intimate knowledge of the enemy’s motivation, intent, will, tactical method and cultural environment will prove to be far more important for success in the advisory phase than smart bombs, aircraft and expansive bandwidth. A successful advisory effort depends on the ability to think and adapt faster than the enemy. Soldiers must be prepared to thrive in an environment of uncertainty, ambiguity and unfamiliar cultural circumstances. This war will be won by fostering personal relationships, leveraging non-military advantages, reading intentions, building trust, converting opinions and managing perceptions, all tasks that demand an exceptional ability to understand people, their culture and their motivations.” “Human Intel vs. Technology,” Washington Times, February 3, 2005; see also Scales, “Culture-Centric Warfare,” Naval Institute: Proceedings, October 2004, www.military.com/Content/MoreContent1?file=NI_1004_Culture-P1.


27. Scholes, “An Advisory Board.”


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